An individual-based bio-economic model (IAM) is presented and applied to the Bay of Biscay sole fishery to investigate alternative quota management systems from a multi-criteria perspective. For this study, the model integrates several institutional arrangements related to catch share management. The current French co-management system with non-transferability of quota is compared to an alternative ITQ system in a context of transition to maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Trade-offs between ecological and socio-economic impacts are highlighted and the effectiveness of governance scenarios is discussed in regard to the challenge of capacity adjustment. Results emphasize that the introduction of ITQ is expected to reduce by 40% the number of vessels in the fishery. While effectively mitigating the economic impacts of the transition phase to MSY, ITQs are also expected to significantly increase the fishing effort by trawlers, which may cause ecological concerns. The scenarios tested also include the simulation of a decommissioning scheme where subsequent decommissioned vessels are significantly different from the vessels that would lease out their quotas in an ITQ system, resulting in differentiated ecological and socio-economic impacts between scenarios.
Introduction

23
Acknowledging the increase of anthropic pressure on fishery resources and the weaknesses of 24 fisheries management solely based on conservation measures, scholars and public authorities now 25 widely recognize that rights-based approaches are desirable for providing fishermen with 26 appropriate incentives for stewardship and sustainability (Grafton et For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record. 
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Management of quotas in France is operated by the administration (regulator) and the producer 138 organizations (POs) with an increasing role of the POs in the last decade (Larabi et al. 2013 ). The POs 139 are groups of harvesters that collectively hold rights to manage their members' fishing activities. PO 140 membership is voluntary and a PO as an entity is somewhat geographically-relevant. In the current 141 Furthermore, the number of vessels and fleet composition are very uneven across POs (see Table S1 148 in supplementary material). 149
Following increasing constraints on their Bay of Biscay sole sub-quotas compared to resource 150 availability, POs have developed various management systems including individual quotas, each PO 151 being free to determine their own rules for quota allocation (Bellanger et al. 2016 ). Management 152 rules are decided at the board of directors in each PO and can vary from year to year according to 153 stock abundance and thus to risks of quota overruns or of unbalanced distribution of catch among 154 seasons or among fleets. In general, POs implement allocation rules in line with two objectives: 155 optimizing the use of the quota by PO members (catch-quota balancing, avoidance of in-season 156 market congestion) and minimizing the monitoring costs and the risks of quota overruns. These 157 allocation rules are based on criteria that vary among POs (e.g. historical landings, gear-based or 158 equal-sharing rules). In 2014, more than 70% of the sole landings were effectively subject to 159 individual quotas (Guyader et al. 2014 ). Besides, POs typically require their members to detail their 160 fishing activity plan before the start of each year so that each PO can internally use some reallocation 161 arrangements as part of a collective management of fishing possibilities. Catch-quota balancing 162 arrangements may also be operated by POs during the fishing season to ensure that quotas of target 163 species are fully exploited. 164
In France, marketed transfers of historical rights or quota trades between producers are not allowed 165 (JORF 1997), not even within POs. More specifically, a PO can reallocate quota from one individual to 166 another within the PO, but this can only be a collective decision at the PO level. Thus, a transfer of 167 allocation cannot be done simply with a mutual agreement between two fishermen and, in any case, 168 cannot involve a monetary transaction. However, vessels can be transferred, and there exists a 169 certain degree of flexibility in the management of historical rights (Larabi et al. 2013 ). Over time, 170 9 reserves of rights were constituted in POs and at the State level alongside decommissioning schemes, 171 fishery exits and vessel sells from one PO to another. These reserves of rights are redistributed 172 according to decisions made within POs or to decisions of a national commission on quotas. POs thus 173 have a critical role in the governance of French quotas, and the French catch share system can be 174 qualified as a co-management system as the regulator has given POs important prerogatives and 175 decision-making responsibilities in terms of managing their sub-quotas. 176 177 
Resources
233
Biological model 234
The stock dynamics of species ‫ݏ‬ are age structured to account for a variety of exploitation patterns 235 by age and by vessel. It follows the Beverton and Holt (1957) equations: 236
with: 237 ܰ ௦,,௧ : the number of individuals of species ‫ݏ‬ of age ܽ in year ‫ݐ‬ 238 ܼ ௦,,௧ : the total mortality, equal to the sum of natural mortality ‫ܯ‬ ௦,,௧ and fishing mortality 239
The spawning stock biomass (SSB) is given by: 241
with: 242 ‫ݓ‬ ௦, : the mean weight at age ܽ in the stock, assumed to be constant over the simulation period 243 ‫ݐܽܯ‬ ௦, : the proportion of mature individuals at age ܽ. 244
In line with ICES methodology (ICES 2015), the recruitment is assumed to be constant over the 245 simulation period for this study. 246
Harvest dynamics
247
Effort and catches 248
Landings of species ‫,ݏ‬ by vessel ݅ and metier ݉, ‫ܮ‬ ,௦,,௧ , are calculated using the Baranov equation: 249
where the fishing mortality ‫ܨ‬ ,௦,,,௧ of species ‫ݏ‬ by age, vessel, and metier is calculated as the 250 product of a catchability coefficient ‫ݍ‬ ,௦,,,௧ and the effort ‫ܧ‬ ,,௧ , the catchability coefficients being 251 computed according to the initial effort and catch per metier of each vessel and the initial fishing 252 mortality per age to account for particular selectivity profiles at the vessel level (Macher et al. 2008) . 253
Additionally, ‫ܨ‬ ,௦,,,௧ can be corrected by a discard factor and ܼ ௦,,௧ accounts for discard survival 254 rates. We see from eq. 3 that ‫ܮ‬ ,௦,,௧ depends not only on the individual fishing mortality but also on 255 the total mortality so that agents effectively interact through stock externalities. 256
Economic model 257
The gross value of landings by vessel and metier is calculated from the landings by species and 258 metier, the ex-vessel price ‫‬ ௦,, of species ‫ݏ‬ (assumed to be constant by fleet*metier), and a gross 259 revenue of other "non-modeled" species by metier assumed to be constant by unit of effort 260 14 ‫ܮܸܩ(‬ ௧, ) as in Raveau et al. (2012) and Gourguet et al. (2013) . The total gross value of landings of 261 ݅ (the vessel ݅ belonging to the fleet ݂) is thus the sum of the gross value of landings by metier: 262
Denoting ‫ݎ‪ℎ‬ݏܿ‬ the crew share of the gross revenue after deduction of variable costs, the crew costs 263 ‫ݓ݁ݎܿܥ(‬ ,௧ ) and the vessel gross operating surplus (ߨ ,௧ ) are then calculated as follows: 264 however, variable costs were found to be proportional of the effort in most cases). 269
The net present value of the net profit at time horizon ܶ, considering a discount rate ‫,ݎ‬ is then 270 computed as the sum of discounted net profits over the discounting period: 271
with ‫ܽܿܥ‬ ,௧ the cost of capital depreciation. 272
Short-term behaviour model 273
The In order to keep the description of the model simple, let us consider the case where there are two 284 metiers ‫1ݐ݁ܯ(‬ and ‫,)2ݐ݁ܯ‬ and one species ‫)ݏ(‬ subject to binding quotas. We further suppose that ‫ݏ‬ 285 is a target species for ‫2ݐ݁ܯ‬ (so that individual landings constraints apply) whereas it is a bycatch for 286 ‫.1ݐ݁ܯ‬ Let ߙ and 1 − ߙ be the relative weight given to anticipated profit and traditions, respectively. 287
We also define ‫ܧ‬ ,,௧ାଵ ெ the anticipated effort on metier ݉ if 100% of the individual allocation ܳ ,௦,௧ାଵ 288 is used on metier ݉: 289
For each vessel ݅: 290
, then 291
, then 292
where
If ߙ ൌ 1, fishing behaviour is entirely driven by the short-term anticipated marginal profit and the 294 effort on ‫1ݐ݁ܯ‬ is set to 0 if ‫2ݐ݁ܯ‬ is more profitable (eq. 9) or set equal to the total effort observed 295 For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record.
during the previous year if the ‫1ݐ݁ܯ‬ is more profitable (eq. 10). If ߙ ൌ 0, the effort on the ‫1ݐ݁ܯ‬ 296 remains constant throughout the simulation. 297
Effort allocation on ‫1ݐ݁ܯ‬ imposes a constraint of available effort for ‫2ݐ݁ܯ‬ ሺ‫ܧ‬ ,ୀெ௧ଶ,௧ାଵ ≤ 298 ‫ܧ‬ ,௫ − ‫ܧ‬ ,ୀெ௧ଵ,௧ାଵ ሻ. The determination of individual effort for ‫2ݐ݁ܯ‬ thus depends on the profit-299 traditions weighting (eq. 9-10) via the maximum effort constraint but also on a landings constraint 300 because ‫2ݐ݁ܯ‬ targets a species that is subject to binding quota. ‫ܧ‬ ,ୀெ௧ଶ,௧ାଵ is therefore such that: 301
where ‫ܮ‬ ,௦,,௧ାଵ is determined according to the Baranov production function (eq. 3). Eq. 11 is a 302 constrained optimization problem and the solution ‫ܧ‬ ,ୀெ௧ଶ,௧ାଵ (that depends on the total 303 mortality ܼ ௦,,௧ାଵ ) is simultaneously found for all ݅ with a convergent iterative process similar to the 304 method of Lagrange multiplier. 305
Long-term behaviour model 306
The long-term fleet dynamics relate to investment and disinvestment decisions that affect the 307 capacity of the fleets. In the model, we consider that vessel entry/exit decisions depend on 308 profitability and potential imperfect malleability of capital as suggested by the theory (Clark et For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record.
where ߱ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ is a parameter that represents capital malleability for the vessel ݅, i.e. whether 317 investment is reversible in terms of vessel resale value for capital when exiting the fishery (with 318 ߱ ൌ 0 corresponding to perfect malleability). 319
Institutional arrangements 320
Harvest control rule 321
The TAC can be either exogenously given, or dynamically modified based on the output data 322 generated by the biological model as part of the management procedure. One such decision rule that 323
we modelled is the determination of a TAC such that the expected fishing mortality is consistent with 324 achieving MSY (i.e. stock exploitation at ‫ܨ‬ ெௌ ) as assumed in the ICES advice procedure. Using the 325 same variable notations as in eq. 1-3, the TAC MSY is computed as follows: 326
. 327
Catch shares 328
The 'institutional arrangements' sub-model makes explicit the distribution of the TAC among 329 member states, the allocation of collective sub-quotas to POs and individual allocations to producers. 330
Let ‫ܶܧܧܮܨ‬ be the entire fleet, i.e. the set of all vessels ݅. For a given Total Allowable Catch in year ‫ݐ‬ 331 ‫ܥܣܶ(‬ ௦,௧ ), the sub-quota ܳ ,௦,௧ allocated to the producer organization ݆, is given by: 332
with ‫ܮ‬ ,௦,ఛ the historical landings of vessel ݅ in year ߬. For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record.
Initial allocation of catch share to producers is then: 334
is the allocation key used by the producer organization ݆, ∑ ߶ ,௦,௧ ∈ ൌ 1. 335
Decommissioning schemes 336
The simulation of a decommissioning scheme can be considered as part of the management 337 procedure. In that case, the decision rule implemented is similar to the one presented in Guyader et 338 al. (2004) . Suppose a vessel ݅ is eligible to a decommissioning premium ‫݉݁ݎܲ‬ ,௧ . It is assumed that 339 the decision at the individual level depends on the net present value of the gross operating surplus at 340 year horizon ܶ and the discounted replacement value of the vessel. Thus, on condition of eligibility to 341 a decommissioning scheme, ݅ exits the fishery before the start of step ‫ݐ‬ + 1 if: 342
with ‫ݒܴ݁‬ ,் the replacement value of vessel ݅ that can be estimated according to the PIM method 343 (IREPA Onlus coordinator 2006). 344
Historical rights management 345
In France, although historical rights are non-tradeable among producers, the historical landings track 346 records attached to scrapped vessels can be transferred to some reserves of historical rights that 347 were created at the national and PO levels alongside decommissioning schemes. These reserves are 348 critical for quota management as they increase the POs' collective quotas, and the benefits of 
where ݆ ௧ is the set of vessels that are member of the PO ݆ at time ‫.ݐ‬ The sub-quota ܳ ,௦,௧ defined in 366 eq. 14 then becomes: 367 For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record.
PO reallocations 368
20
To ensure that quotas of target species are fully exploited, a reallocation mechanism within POs can 369 be considered when the anticipated individual quota consumption is less than 100%. We denote by 370 ݉ ൌ ‫ݐ݁݃ݎܽݐ‬ the metier that targets the species ‫ݏ‬ managed with individual quotas ‫ܧ(‬ ,ୀ௧௧,௧ is 371 thus the control variable that the model adjusts to try to obtain ‫ܮ‬ ,௦,௧ ൌ ܳ ,௦,௧ ). Defining the landings 372 per unit of effort ‫ܧܷܲܮ‬ ,௦,,௧ as 373
and the anticipated individual quota surplus ܳ ,௦,௧ାଵ ∆ as 374
the reallocation mechanism operates as follows: for each vessel ݅ of the PO ݆, if ܳ ,௦,௧ାଵ
where ܳ ,௧ାଵ ௨ௗ௧ is the new value of ܳ ,௧ାଵ after reallocation. Note that the variable ܳ ,௦,௧ାଵ ∆ is fixed by 376 eq. 21 and is not updated by the procedure defined with eq. 22 so that ൛݅ ∈ ݆ ௧ାଵ |ܳ ,௦,௧ାଵ 
with 387
where the price of one unit of quota ‫‬ ௦,௧ ௨௧ is unknown and must be adjusted such that supply and 388 demand coincide in a context of individual profit maximization. Since for each vessel the individual 389 effort needed to reach a given objective in terms of landings depends on the efforts of all the other 390 vessels (eq. 3), it is in fact a multi-dimensional problem whose complexity increases with the number 391 of vessels. To avoid the difficulties related to multi-dimensional solving, the problem can be 392 transformed into an iterative process involving successive one-dimensional optimizations and 393 convergent key factors correction. This transformation allows using standard linear programming 394 routines to efficiently find a solution. The convergence procedure used to determine ‫‬ ௦,௧ ௨௧ under 395 constraints is: 396 For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record.
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where ߣ, ߝ ଵ , ߝ ଶ > 0 are set to ensure a balance between quick convergence and precision of 397 estimation. The price of quota and the individual efforts can then be derived simultaneously with a 398 nested iterative procedure aimed at achieving double convergence. As the costs and the production 399 function are assumed linear, solutions are corner solutions for each individual vessel that will either 400 lease in quota to be able to fish until its maximum effort or will lease out its own quota. If there are 401 multiple metiers, a 'lease-out vessel' typically leases out the entire share of its quota not dedicated 402 to metiers for which species ‫ݏ‬ is a bycatch, so that a share of the quota apportioned to cover bycatch 403 may be retained for the vessel to maintain a fishing activity on a metier that does not target ‫.ݏ‬ 404
Scenarios for the impact assessment of alternative catch share systems For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record.
-long-term fleet dynamics relating to disinvestment decisions defined by eq. 12 and the 419 mechanisms replicating the transfer of historical rights of scrapped vessels to reserves (eq. 420
17-19) 421
-impossibility of investment in new vessels, which relates to the CFP management plan for the 422
Bay of Biscay sole fishery that prevents increasing capacity. 423
Quota co-management Baseline (BA) scenario 424
This first scenario corresponds to the current co-management system of sole quota where each PO 425 operates the redistribution of its collective sub-quota among its members according to its own rules 426 and individual allocations are assumed non-transferable. With this scenario, the aim is that almost all 427 vessels remain active as fishery exit is only considered for vessels that are non-profitable (eq. 12). 428
Reallocation mechanisms (eq. 21-22) are included to simulate the collective management of quotas 429 operated by POs. 430
Quota co-management Decommissioning Scheme (DS) scenario 431
In this second scenario, we consider a co-management catch-share system similar to the BA scenario 432 (including the non-transferability of individual allocation and the quota reallocation mechanism) with 433 the additional postulate that the State operates in year ‫ݐ‬ ൌ ‫ݐ‬ ௌ a publicly funded decommissioning 434 scheme (without constraint on funding availability) to reduce the fleet capacity. We assume that the 435 decision of staying or decommissioning is instantaneous at the start of the year ‫ݐ‬ ௌ (eq. 16). The 436 transfer of historical rights associated to vessels decommissioning (eq. 17-19), typical of the French 437 co-management system, is of particular importance in this scenario since it determines how the 438 quotas of decommissioned vessels are redistributed among the remaining vessels. 439
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) scenario 440
In this scenario, each individual vessel is granted a share of the TAC that can then be traded on a 441 quota lease market (eq. 23-25). We make the assumption that the Bay of Biscay sole is the only 442 were used to parameterize fishing and natural mortality, stock numbers and weight at age in the 455 biological sub-model (see Table S18 in supplementary material for parameter values). Accordingly, 456 the recruitment was assumed constant and equal to the geometric mean on years 1993-2012. 457
Effort and production data in tonnage and value by vessel and metier were calculated from the 458 SACROIS data source which is an algorithm crossing multiple existing data sources (auction halls, 459 logbooks, dealer reports) to provide the best possible estimation of effort and production by vessel 460 at the trip level (source: IFREMER/Fisheries Information System/DPMA). Economic data on variable 461 cost per unit of effort and fixed cost structure were available for a sample of vessels in 2013 (see 462   Table S19 in supplementary material for average cost structures by sub-fleet and length class) and 463 were then estimated by vessel for 2014 according to their sub-fleet and length class (the sub-fleet 464 and length class segmentation is identical to the one used in Table 1 For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record.
Nephrops by commercial grade were assumed to be constant and were calculated on year 2014 for 466 each intersection of sub-fleet, length class, and metier. 467
As a simplifying assumption we consider that each vessel plans its fishing activities by choosing 468 among two metiers: 469 -"sole metier", corresponding to the fishing activity that targets sole 470
-"other metier", corresponding to the fishing activity where sole is not targeted and considered a 471
bycatch. 472
Fishing mortality by metier is parameterized at the vessel-trip level using a criterion that was 473 specifically determined for the Bay of Biscay dermersal fisheries, defining a fishing trip as targeting 474 sole when sole represents more than 6% of the trip landings in weight and Nephrops represents less 475 than 10% (ICES 2015). Individual efforts on sole metier are control variables of the bio-economic 476 model that can be endogenously determined to achieve a given fishing mortality. Individual efforts 477 on other metier are initialized based on the reference year. 478 PO affiliations (membership) and historical landings were obtained with the actual database that was 479 used for the French administration to determine the allocation of catch shares to POs. The 480 distribution keys used by POs for the initial allocation of individual quotas to vessels are assumed 481
proportional to the landings of reference ‫ܮ‬ ,௦ୀ௦,௧ୀଶଵସ . Regarding the transfer of historical rights 482 associated with fishery exits, we assume that the share transferred to the PO reserve is ‫ݎ‪ℎ‬ݏܱܲ‬ ൌ 1 483 for all vessel ݅ that have PO membership whereas non-PO vessels are such that ‫ݎ‪ℎ‬ݏܶܣܰ‬ ൌ 1. 
Results
538
Evolution under the quota co-management baseline (BA) scenario 539 The baseline co-management scenario toward MSY resulted in a limited decrease of the number of 540 vessels (-4% on the simulation period; see Fig. 3 ) and thus in the conservation of the fleet structure in 541 general. In this case, fishery exits were disinvestment decisions due to negative profits and vessels 542 that left were decommissioned without premium. This scenario achieved satisfactory ecological 543 objectives in general including the rebuilding of the sole and Nephrops stocks ( For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record. recovery induced higher landings per unit of effort (Fig. 5a ). The total trawling energy effort 548 decreased by 33% between 2014 and 2017, and then only slightly increased between 2017 and 2025 549 (+7%) (Fig. 5b) . Not surprisingly, the total fuel consumption followed an analogous path (Fig. S5 in  550 supplementary material). 551
From an economic sustainability perspective, the primary concern was the economic viability of the 552 fleet in a context of overcapacity and transition to MSY. The total gross operating surplus of the 553 fishery decreased by 27% between 2014 and 2017 due to decreasing TACs (Fig. 6a) . The economic 554 viability of the fleet hit its lowest point in 2017 with 7% of vessels having a negative gross operating 555 surplus that year (Fig. 6b) between 2017 and 2025 (+5%) but remained significantly lower than their initial level (Fig. 7a) . The 563 average time at sea followed a similar trajectory (Fig. 7c) . Contrastingly, the average hourly wage per 564 crew increased from 18 €/h to 28 €/h over the simulation period (Fig. 7d) so that the average yearly 565 wage per crew in 2025 was greater than its 2014 level (+20%) despite the reduction of the time at 566 sea. Therefore, these results suggested that the socio-economic benefits expected from MSY 567 exploitation were mostly directed to enhance wages rather than the number of jobs in the fishery. 568
Additionally, the salary increases appeared to be accompanied by a moderate augmentation of the 569 total inequality among yearly wage per crew (Fig. S10 in supplementary material) . The 570 decomposition of this inequality by segments indicated that this was due to increased inequality 571 between fleets and more heterogeneous wages within the larger-scale vessels length classes (see Fig.  572 Page 29 of 50 Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. Downloaded from www.nrcresearchpress.com by IFREMER BIBLIOTHEQUE LA PEROUSE on 01/02/18
For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record. S11 in supplementary material). Since most vessels remained active in this scenario, changes in fleet 573 composition and territorial impacts were minimal. 574
Trade-offs achieved under the quota co-management decommissioning scheme (DS) 575 scenario 576
In the DS scenario, the simulated decommissioning scheme resulted in the exit (with premium) of 61 577 vessels that were constituted of 12-18 m trawlers for the most part (Fig. 4a) . In contrast, only a few 578 sole netters were expected to leave the fishery within this decommissioning scheme. As the 579 discounted replacement value of vessels at the end of the discounting period was not very significant 580 for most vessels, the main drivers of the individual decision to stay or leave were the net present 581 value of the expected gross operating surplus and the decommissioning premium. 582
Overall, the DS option performed better than the BA option on ecological indicators (Table 2) . 583
Particularly, the total fishing effort and trawling energy effort were decreased (-10% and -16% in 584 2017, respectively). The DS scenario also achieved better economic efficiency than the baseline as 585 the net present value of profits over the whole simulation period was increased by 6% (Table 3) . The 586 economic viability of the fleet was improved during the transition phase (+7% in 2017). In addition, 587 the economic inequality was decreased (-7% compared to the BA scenario in the year after the 588 application of the decommissioning scheme), this reduction being mostly associated to distributional 589 changes in the trawler fleets (Fig. S9c in supplementary material) . This result can be explained by the 590 fact that the vessels that exited the fishery with a decommissioning premium were essentially vessels 591 with poor economic performances, so that the vessels that remained in the fleet were somewhat 592 more homogenous in terms of revenue. 593
Social impacts of the DS scenario included lower employment hours in the fishery than in the BA 594 31 material), as a result of the decommissioning scheme. Therefore, the effectiveness of the DS scenario 597 in the social dimension was contrasted between lower employment hours and improved wage 598 conditions. In addition, changes in fleet composition in this scenario mainly concerned the 599 decommissioning of 12-18 m trawlers that essentially operated in the north of the Bay of Biscay. 600
Trade-offs achieved under the ITQ scenario 601 In the ITQ scenario, supplier or buyer vessels depended on the marginal profit per kg of sole 602 compared to the equilibrium price of the quota (see Figs. S6 and S7 in supplementary material) . 603
Depending on the year, between 39% and 46% of vessels leased out their individual quota of sole. 604
The main suppliers were the sole netters and the specialized Nephrops trawlers, whereas the main 605 buyers were the mixed netters and mixed bottom trawlers (Fig. 4b) . Therefore, it appeared that 606 highly specialized fleets had a lower willingness to pay than mixed fleets for which acquiring more 607 quotas of sole increased the possibilities to catch a mix of species that included sole. Additionally, 608 most vessels that leased out their quota of sole maintained a fishing activity on an "other metier" 609 (these vessels are referred to as 'active lease-out vessels', as opposed to 'inactive lease-out vessels' 610 that stopped their fishing activity completely). 611
As the final distribution of quota according to the ITQ option was essentially shifted from sole netters 612 fleet to the trawlers fleets that had an exploitation pattern less selective of smaller individuals, the 613 sole SSB recovered less quickly than in the co-management options (Table 2) . Ecological sustainability 614 proxies also indicated that ITQ would induce greater carbon footprint and impacts on habitats due to 615 increased fishing effort by trawlers. 616
The management of quotas through ITQs appeared to be the most economically efficient option both 617 in the short and long terms (Fig. 6a) . As compared to the baseline, the ITQ scenario increased the 618 gross operating surplus of the fishery by 69% during the phase of transition to MSY and by 33% the 619 net present value of profits over the whole simulation period (Table 3 ). This significant increase was 620 For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record. mainly driven by quota transfers from netters to trawlers that made it possible for less-specialized 621 fleets to increase their fishing effort and profits as acquiring additional quota also allowed them to 622 catch their by-products that represented a large part of their gross revenue. Economic impacts also 623 included increased inequality between vessels after the introduction of ITQs (+25% in 2025). 624
According to the decomposition by fleet, it appeared that this was mainly due to an increase in 625 inequality within the sole netters and, to a lesser extent, within the mixed bottom trawlers (Fig. S9e  626 in supplementary material). It was also notable that inequality increased within all length classes (Fig.  627 S9f), which suggested that small-scale and large-scale vessels were all concerned with this issue in 628 the ITQ scenario. 629
As regards social sustainability indicators, the ITQ scenario leads to higher employment hours and 630 average yearly wage, but this is mostly related to a higher time at sea per year ( Fig. 7; Table 4 ). In 631 fact, average hourly wage is lower than in the other scenarios. In addition, wage inequality greatly 632 increase due to distributional changes in the sole netters and mixed bottom trawlers fleets (see For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record. For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record.
Sensitivity analysis
689
We performed a sensitivity analysis to examine the effects of alterations in parameter values on the 690 trade-offs achieved in each scenario. We focused on sensitivity to two key parameters, namely the 691 profit-tradition weight ߙ and the capital malleability parameter ߱, which are related to short-term 692 and long-term dynamics, respectively. We considered ߙ ∈ ሼ0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.40, 0.80ሽ, the base-693 case parameter value being ߙ ൌ 0.20 which was set according to empirical estimates found in 694 Marchal et al. (2013) . The base-case value for the capital malleability parameter was ߱ ൌ 0.05, and 695 values tested ranged from ߱ ൌ 0, in which case all vessels that had negative profits at the end of a 696 time step exited the fishery, to ߱ ൌ 0.20, which corresponded to a situation where investment was 697 hardly reversible in terms of vessel resale value for capital and almost all vessels stayed in the fishery. 698 Table 5 shows the effects of changes measured as deviation from base-case values of global fishing 699 effort and gross operating surplus for each scenario separately. Additional results of the sensitivity 700 analysis for fuel consumption and average hourly wage are provided in supplementary material (Figs. 701 S12 and S13). 702
Overall, results of the simulations were robust to changes in values of parameters ߙ and ߱, which 703 showed that outcomes were more influenced by the management interventions defined in each 704 scenario than by parameter values of the short-and long-term behaviour models. Observed changes 705 in SSB and total landings were negligible (less than 1% deviation compared to base-case values) as 706 the harvest control rule was not directly impacted by alterations of ߙ and ߱. The most significant 707 impacts on fishing effort and gross operating surplus were observed for greater alterations of ߙ 708 (Table 5 ). In the short term, the greater the weight given to profit in effort allocation, the more 709 fishing effort and surplus increased. In the long term, individual efforts on "other metier" tended to 710 converge towards either zero or maximum effort, yielding an equilibrium effort allocation. For values 711 of ߙ less than 0.1, the rate at which effort allocation can shift from one metier to another was not 712 high enough to reach equilibrium by the end of the simulation period, which explains why results 713 38 observed for 2025 did not follow the same trend across all values of ߙ. Moreover, while changes in ߙ 714 affected outcomes in all three scenarios in the same way (depending on the indicator, either positive 715 or negative deviations across all scenario), alterations of ߱ tended to have opposite effects on 716 different scenarios (e.g. setting ߱ ൌ 0.20 increased the fishing effort in the BA scenario and 717 decreased it in the DS scenario). In addition, indicators were somewhat more sensitive to changes in 718 ߙ than in ߱, suggesting that short-term dynamics had more influence than long-term behaviours on 719 the outcomes of the model (Figs. S12 and S13 in supplementary material) . Nonetheless, the main 720 driving forces behind the results appeared to be the different institutional designs of the 721 management procedure as the trade-offs achieved in each scenario were not significantly changed 722 by varying parameter values. 723 For personal use only. This Just-IN manuscript is the accepted manuscript prior to copy editing and page composition. It may differ from the final official version of record.
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outcome is specific to our case study and do not apply to ITQ programs in general, this underscores 754 the necessity to readdress the question of fuel tax exemptions that appear to be in contradiction 755 with the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Borrello et The quota market simulated in this study is assumed to be a quota lease market whereas most ITQ 762 programs also allow for permanent transfer of quota shares (Holland 2016 market and found significant declines in fishing effort, similar to experiences in many fisheries that 802 have moved to ITQs (Grafton et al. 1996) . 803
